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Abstract: In recent years scholars have examined Kant’s critical turn as a break from his 
earlier work on natural history. According to this view, Kant’s pre-critical natural history 
attempted to explain the present organisation of matter through a law-governed historical 
development. The critical Kant, however, saw that organisation is contingent on experience. 
The outcome of Kant’s ‘turn’ is thus that natural history is denied scientific status, for 
investigation that begins with experience cannot bear knowledge of its necessity. While I 
agree that Kant’s critical turn alters the status of natural history, in contrast to recent 
scholarship I argue that it does not so much break from his pre-critical natural history as 
transform it. In response to the criticisms levelled against his work by Forster and Herder in 
the mid- to late-1780s Kant aimed to reconcile his theory of organised matter with the critical 
programme. The result is not a teleological account of natural origins but rather a teleological 
method that guides investigation of objects whose form cannot be understood apart from 
temporal variation. 
 




 In recent years Kant’s pre-critical work on natural history has gained significant 
attention. Scholars have recognised that Kant’s nebular hypothesis of the formation of the 
solar system, his identification of the Milky Way as a rotating galaxy, and his reproductive 
account of heredity make innovative contributions to key debates in eighteenth century 
natural history.1 Of course, none of these ideas are especially novel. Kant borrowed his 
nebular hypothesis from Thomas Wright of Durham,2 his theory of vortices develops Herman 
Boerhaave and Stephen Hales’ speculative reading of Newton’s Opticks,3 and his account of 
heredity draws directly from Georges Buffon’s Histoire Naturelle.4 What is significant about 
Kant’s work on natural history is that it helped to legitimise several marginal views by 
                                                            
1 For example, see Shea 1986, Schönfeld 2000, Watkins 2003, Sloan 2006. 
2 Schaffer 1978. 
3 Massimi 2001. 
4 Adickes 1924. 
transforming the descriptive practice of natural history into an explanatory science that 
accounts for the present organisation of matter according to laws. 
Despite increasing scholarly interest in Kant’s pre-critical natural history, it is widely 
held that the critical Kant shifted his scientific ideal from speculative natural history to 
mathematically demonstrable physics. As Martin Schönfeld explains, Kant’s pre-critical 
natural history ended ‘in a grandiose failure’ as Kant came to the conclusion that only what 
can be constituted can be known.5 For the critical Kant, the present organisation of matter is 
utterly contingent on the laws of experience, which are impervious to the arrangement of 
matter. Thus the use of rational categories to explain things that cannot be experienced is a 
spurious and unverifiable form of metaphysics. As Kant elaborates in Metaphysische 
Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaften, a proper science must be ‘systematic’, constitute an 
‘interconnection of grounds and consequences’, and provide ‘apodictic’ certainty (MAN, AA 
04: 468). Only mathematics and physics reach this high theoretical standard, for only they can 
bear ‘consciousness of their necessity’. The ‘improper’ or ‘figurative sciences’ 
(uneigentlische Wissenschaften), on the other hand, work to discover laws that are contingent 
on experience. The problem for such sciences is that the a priori principles of the 
understanding provide no guarantee that experience is anything more than a ‘labyrinth of the 
multiplicity of possible empirical laws’ (EEKU, AA 20: 214). Because the understanding has 
no grounds to expect that nature, as the sum of appearances in thoroughgoing interconnection, 
hangs together as a system, the best a posteriori sciences can hope for are ‘shaky hypotheses’. 
 While the critical turn is often interpreted as a re-evaluation of natural science under 
the constitutive ideal of physics, several scholars have drawn attention to Kant’s renewed 
engagement with methodological questions in the practice of natural history in his third 
Critique, Kritik der Urteilskraft. Peter McLaughlin explores Part 2, Critique of the 
Teleological Power of Judgment, as a ‘reflection on philosophical, in particular, 
methodological problems that arose through the constitution of an independent science of 
life.’6 For John Zammito it is ‘the culmination of Kant’s biological reflections.’7 That Kant 
would return to matters of a science of life raises several pressing questions for our 
understanding of Kant’s development. If the critical turn separates speculative natural history 
from proper physics, and denies the scientific status of the former, what scientific role could 
natural history play in Kant’s mature philosophy? If critical philosophy denies a posteriori 
                                                            
5 Schönfeld 2000, 126.  
6 McLaughlin 1990, 1. Others have gone a step further to claim that the critical turn itself was informed 
by theoretical questions arising in natural history during the mid-eighteenth century. Philip Sloan 
argues that late eighteenth-century biological thought ‘illuminates the issue of the foundation and 
necessity of the categories and the status of the a priori’ in KrV (Sloan 2002, 230). Jennifer Mensch 
claims that the epigenesist theory of organisation ‘had a significant role to play for Kant’s theory of 
cognition’ (Mensch 2013, 2). 
7 Zammito 1992, 214. See also Zumbach 1984. 
sciences any explanatory power, why does Kant return to questions of method in natural 
history in a third critique? 
In this paper I argue that Kant’s critical turn does not so much break from his pre-
critical natural history as transform it, issuing a new understanding of experimental science as 
a research programme. To do so I examine Kant’s extensive reflections on natural history’s 
teleological method throughout the 1770s and 1780s, giving particular focus to debates with 
interlocutors Johann Georg Forster and Johann Gottfried Herder in the mid-1780s. This 
analysis will show that Kant not only remained concerned with developments in the field of 
natural history throughout the critical period but also that his critique of leading research 
programmes provided the conceptual work for the teleological principle that grounds his third 
Critique. Kant’s engagement with Herder and Forster moved him to reconcile his theory of 
organised matter with the critical philosophy. The result is a teleological method for the 
practice of natural history that does not provide knowledge of historical development but 
guides the empirical investigation of objects whose form cannot be understood apart from 
temporal variation.8 
 
1. Pre-critical natural history 
1.1 Natural history before Kant 
Before turning to Kant’s writings on natural history during the critical period I begin 
by identifying the teleological method Kant pursued in his pre-critical work. Natural history 
in the Baconian tradition was not directly concerned with teleology. It consisted rather in the 
description of nature’s actual or present arrangement. Bacon’s original vision for natural 
history in Advancement of Learning (1605) operated as a pre-philosophical descriptive 
endeavour aimed at providing the ‘primary matter’ for natural philosophy. Against 
speculative philosophies that accounted for natural events according to non-physical causes, 
                                                            
8 The method I use draws from Imre Lakatos, who argues that ‘the typical descriptive unit of great 
scientific achievements is not an isolated hypothesis but rather a research programme’ (Lakatos 1978, 
4). Lakatos shifts the historian’s focus from specific hypotheses to a collection of experimental 
practices grounded on a hard core of theoretical assumptions, assumptions that cannot be abandoned 
without abandoning the programme altogether. When faced with anomalies, proponents of a research 
programme must build ‘auxiliary hypotheses’ to protect the hard core. Lakatos suggests that change in 
the history of science occurs when ‘progressive research programmes replace degenerating ones’ 
(Lakatos 1978, 6). While Karl Popper was critical of scientists who respond to anomalies with 
auxiliary hypotheses, Lakatos argues that a research programme can be progressive if recent changes to 
its auxiliary hypotheses have achieved greater explanatory or predictive power. When a research 
programme becomes degenerative, however, we find the need for a new progressive system of 
theories. In what follows I draw from Lakatos’ methodology to suggest that Forster and Herder 
represent two responses to the growing awareness that the popular Linnaean tradition of natural history 
was in a degenerative period. While Forster remained committed to the theoretical assumptions of the 
established programme and thus saw the need for further auxiliary hypotheses, Herder searched for a 
new system of theoretical commitments. In response to both positions, Kant advocated instead for a 
change in status of how the theoretical assumptions of natural history operate in research practice in 
such a way that shifts the notion of science as a finished system in the direction of science as a research 
programme (see Butts 1986, 1990). 
Bacon proposed that natural philosophy, ‘the general into the inquiry of causes and 
productions of effects’,9 takes place in and as a part of natural history. With the primary 
matter of natural history in hand, natural philosophy takes two modes of explanation to 
account for what has been found: physic, which describes the ‘variable or respective causes’ 
(the efficient and material causes), and metaphysic, which describes the ‘fixed and constant 
causes’ (the formal and final causes).10 This is to say that that physic ‘should handle that 
which supposeth in nature only a being and moving’, while metaphysic ‘should handle that 
which supposeth further in nature a reason, understanding, and platform.’11 Teleology is thus 
a part of metaphysic, for it accounts for the arrangement of matter according to ends. While it 
features as the highest mode of leaning in Bacon’s pyramid of knowledge, it is highly 
restricted, pertaining only to those items that cannot be explained according to movement. 
Bacon was highly critical of the use of metaphysic to explain physical events, for ‘men 
(which is the root of all error) have made too untimely a departure [from physic], and too 
remote a recess from particulars.’12 
Bacon’s attempt to ground natural philosophy on a descriptive, factual basis had a 
marked influence on the practice of natural philosophy in both the British and French 
traditions of natural philosophy. By the 1670s an ‘experimental’ form of natural history 
featured as the prevailing methodological approach in the Royal Society.13 The earliest 
members of the Royal Society, including Robert Boyle, Robert Hooke, Robert Plot, and John 
Woodward, followed Bacon’s the wholehearted rejection of speculative system building and 
sought to construct a new experimental paradigm in its place. By the early-eighteenth century 
key members of l’Académie Royale des Sciences also employed an experimental research 
program. French natural historians built on the method and findings of the British 
experimental scientists to overcome the philosophical tendency to trivialize the significance 
of matter, thereby contributing to the growing divide between experimental and speculative 
philosophy.14 
In the mid-eighteenth century two rival programmes of natural history rose to 
prominence. In Systema naturae, first published in 1735, Swedish botanist Carl Linneaus 
followed the Baconian experimental tradition to develop the binomial system of nomenclature 
and the hierarchy of seven main groups, the lowest of which are species and variety. The 
Linnaean classificatory system is based on the assumption that a static, ‘progenitorial unity’ 
exists outside of space and time as the result of ‘some Omnipotent or Omniscient Being, 
                                                            
9 Bacon 1901, VII. 3. 
10 Bacon 1901, VII. 5. 
11 Bacon 1901, VII. 3. 
12 Bacon 1901, VII. 5. 
13 Anstey 2002, 65. 
14 Anstey [in press], 13. 
namely God, whose work is called Creation.’15 From the assumption that the system we find 
in nature is the result of a direct creative act, Linnaeus derives three methodological 
principles: (1) ‘there are no new species, (2) ‘like always gives birth to like’, (3) ‘one in each 
species was at the beginning of the progeny’. The Linnaean God not only created matter at 
the origin of the cosmos, but also imbued it with systematic form. Building on these 
principles, Linnaeus’ methodology classifies how objects appear to the observer in the 
present. A species is categorized by the shared possession of invariable or fixed heritable 
characteristics (following Aristotle, physiology and anatomy were the primary candidates). A 
variety is categorized according to accidental alterations within a given species (size, colour, 
shape etc.). Despite the appearance of variation, Linnaeus maintains the perfection of God’s 
original creation by assuming the immutability of species. The apparent change in species is 
simply the variation of accidental characteristics. 
Against the hierarchical and abstract nature of the Linnaean system, French natural 
historian Georges Buffon developed an alternative programme for natural history.16 In the 
Preliminary Discourse (1749) to Histoire Naturelle, Buffon attacks Bacon’s natural 
history/natural philosophy distinction, which separates experimentation from the investigation 
of causes. He denigrates the ‘abstract’ truths of physics that derive generalizable principles in 
favour of ‘physical’ truths that are grounded on succession and repetition of events in time 
and space.17 By placing physical truths over the abstract, Buffon locates the system of nature 
in space and time. He posits the existence of teleological kind of causality in the form of 
interior moulding forces (moule intérieur), organising powers that are known only through 
the emergent physical relations between living beings. Buffon revives the speculative 
accounts of natural origins rejected by Bacon to explain for the historical development of 
nature’s order across extremely long periods of time, going as far as to permit species 
degeneration and even extinction. He does not, however, accept the full mutability of 
species.18 Rather, the interior moulding force unique to each species expresses itself in 
various ways according to contingent environmental conditions, and passes these variations 
on to the following generations.19 Thus to discover the unity of a species the natural historian 
should not look for actual, physiological affinities but rather for the potential for fertile 
reproduction between apparently different kinds. Buffon’s classificatory programme is 
                                                            
15 Linnaeus 1735, 18. 
16 Sloan 1990, 304. 
17 Buffon 1749, 53-54. 
18 In volume XIII of Histoire Naturelle entitled Dégéneration des animaux (1766) Buffon broadens the 
boundaries of the interior moulds. While he does not a full account of species mutability, he speaks of 
significant historical ‘degenerations’ in some species, allowing him to identify ‘families’ with several 
branches. For example, he places quadrupeds into a limited number of original stems. 
19 Buffon 1749, 35. 
grounded on the empirical criterion of generation: organisms are classified as the same 
species, no matter how great the variation, based on their capacity to produce fertile young. 
 
1.2 Kant’s universal natural history 
In ‘Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels’ (1755) Kant sides with 
Buffon’s vision for natural history. In the attempt to build a genuinely historical astronomical 
system Kant extends the established programme of celestial mechanics into an evolutionary 
cosmology that accounts for the present organisation of matter as the achievement of an 
extended period of time: 
 
Creation is not the work of one moment. After it has made a beginning with the 
production of an infinity of substances and matter, it is effective throughout the entire 
sequence of eternity with ever increasing degrees of fruitfulness. Millions and whole 
mountain ranges of millions of centuries will pass within which ever new worlds and 
world-orders will form and attain perfection … Creation is never complete. It is true 
that it began once, but it will never stop. (NTH, AA 01: 314) 
 
Kant’s idea of cosmological development builds on the insights of Thomas Wright’s ‘An 
Original Theory or New Hypothesis of the Universe’ (1750), a report of which appeared in 
German in the Hamburg journal Freye Urtheile und Nachrichten in January 1751. Kant 
explains that Wright’s ideas were the original source that gave him ‘cause to regard the fixed 
stars not as a scattered milling mass without any visible order’ but rather as a ‘a systematic 
constitution’ (NTH, AA 01: 231). The clue for Wright was the shape of the Milky Way, 
which guides a thought experiment about the role of attractive and repulsive force in the 
formation of vortices. The Cartesian theory of vortices speculates that celestial movement can 
follow stratified bands of secondary or primary matter left over from the fracture of larger 
elements.20 With the help of Wright, Kant’s model avoids such speculation by using attraction 
to explain the condensation of the galactic cloud and repulsion to set it spinning (NTH, AA 
01: 250). Systematic order, in Kant’s pre-critical view, can emerge from mechanical 
principles alone, provided one begins with the right theory of matter. 
 The integration of continuous alteration into the static programme of eighteenth 
century celestial mechanics was a controversial venture, as the idea of development contains 
within it a contradiction. If the system of nature was ordained by God, then it must be perfect. 
Any change in this state would thus imply a departure from divine perfection.21 While Buffon 
was, at least in part, willing to accept the existence of degeneration, Wright and Kant aimed 
                                                            
20 See Descartes 1983, III 48-54. 
21 Schaffer 1978, 180. 
to show that development could be reconciled with the stability of the universal order. For 
Wright, at least in his 1750 essay,22 this was a matter of recognizing the limits of natural 
philosophy: ‘how the heavenly bodies were made, when they were made, and what they are 
made of, … seems to our present sight not to be within the reach of human philosophy.’23 
That ‘they do exist, have final causes, and were ordained for some wise end, is evident 
beyond doubt.’ For Kant, the task of accounting for cosmological origins could be attempted, 
yet only by assuming an original organising power imbued within the basic particles of 
matter. To understand the present organisation of matter according to mechanical laws, one 
must assume a contingent, original organisation from which these laws follow. Anticipating 
the physical account of monads he develops in ‘Physical Monadology’ of the following year, 
Kant collapses Newton’s distinction between the laws of ‘existence’ and the laws of 
‘creation’ to account for everything from the elasticity of the atmosphere to the formation of 
Saturn’s rings according to the activity of subtle particles of matter that were originally 
diffused across space. What appears as a starry chaos is in fact the reorganisation of the 
cosmic order by powers inherent to matter. Development is permitted so long as the unity of 
the system as a whole is preserved. 
Kant’s account of natural history has received divergent interpretations in the 
literature. Some scholars argue that Kant’s attempt to outline a purely mechanical cosmology 
signals a rejection of speculative mechanics and pre-modern teleology.24 Yet this is only 
partly correct. Kant’s aim is to use mechanical forces to explain the development of 
perfection from an original chaos. God has put a ‘secret art’ into natural forces, Kant claims, 
to bring about an evolution from chaos to a more perfect cosmic constitution (NTH, AA 01: 
229). The material building blocks of nature are not inert particles but active centres of force 
driven by a striving to ‘unfold’ themselves (NTH, AA 01: 226). Noting Kant’s active account 
of matter, other scholars have claimed that Kant’s natural history is in fact a break from 
Newton’s mechanical account of force, which, as Newton outlines in Principia, is simply the 
observed regularity of mechanical phenomena.25 While it is true that Kant was busy trying to 
reconcile a Leibnizian account of monads with a physical influx theory of causation during 
the 1750s, this project was not entirely foreign to Newtonian science. As Robert Schofield has 
demonstrated, Newton’s more speculative account of matter in the Opticks gave rise to a 
materialist Newtonianism in the eighteenth century that identified the causes of all 
phenomena in a unique substance, the ether.26 While Kant no longer refers to the ether as an 
                                                            
22 In his 1755 essay ‘Second or singular thoughts upon the theory of the universe’, Wright uses fire as 
the basis for God’s action, which conserves while also transforming the cosmos. 
23 Wright 1837, 12. 
24 For example, see Schneider 1966, Shea 1986. 
25 Schönfeld 2000, 111. 
26 Schofield 1970. 
explanatory device, as he did in his early essay ‘On Fire’, his notion of force as the inner 
essence of matter shows a continued influence from the speculative tradition of Newtonian 
experimentalism.27  
What is important to note for our present purposes is that Kant’s speculation about 
teleology is direct: the telos of nature is the visible striving toward perfection, which indicates 
that the purpose of nature is nature’s perfection (NTH, AA 01: 228, 262-3, 314). Final means 
and goal-states are immanent within nature as a system. In line with Buffon’s efforts to 
identify a genuinely historical dimension to the system of nature, the idea of ‘perfection’ for 
Kant does not entail a telos external to the cosmos but rather a union of the sensible and 
intelligible, the scientific and metaphysical, made possible through his dynamical account of 
basic particles. 
While Kant is primarily concerned with celestial mechanics in NTH, he recognizes 
that organic structure poses an explanatory challenge to his natural system. The organised 
structure of even the simplest form of life, such as a worm, is far more complex than the 
mechanical structure of the cosmos (NTH, AA 01: 230). While Kant’s argument is that we 
can say, ‘Give me matter and I will build you a world out of it’, he raises the question,  
 
Are we in a position to say: Give me matter and I will show you how a worm can be 
created? Don’t we get stuck at the first step due to ignorance about the true inner 
nature of the object and the complexity of the diversity contained within it? (NTH, 
AA 01: 230) 
 
Kant concedes that his account of matter cannot explain organisation. However, his reference 
to ‘inner nature’ and ‘complexity’ suggests that the difficulty is not so much qualitative as 
quantitative. Later in the essay Kant speculates directly about organic structure, suggesting 
that the mechanical unfolding of the cosmos eventually leads to the evolution of life and 
rationality. His aspiration to unify science and metaphysics ultimately leads him to combine 
the quantitative and qualitative aspects of reality in a single domain. 
 
1.3 Natural description and natural history 
The development of living beings is an on-going theme in Kant’s lectures on 
anthropology and physical geography given throughout the 1760s and 70s. In an essay that 
accompanied the promotional material for the lectures in 1775 and 1777, ‘Von den 
verschiedenen Racen der Menschen’, Kant tackles the question of how the various forms of 
                                                            
27 Massimi 2011. 
human life are related.28 Is Homo a genus, to be broken down into distinct and invariable 
species? Or is the diversity of human form a contingent matter of variety stemming from 
Homo as a single species?  
In the two versions of this essay Kant is not simply concerned with organic structure, 
as he was in NTH, but also with how such structure features within the explanations used by 
natural historians. In Kant’s view the Linnaean programme of natural history provided an 
arbitrary system of classification. In later editions of Systema naturae (1771) Linnaeus 
responded to the growing reports of human diversity with a revised classificatory schema that 
admitted four species in the genus Homo, each of with contained distinct varieties.29 For Kant, 
Linnaeus’ proposal simply imposes an abstract system onto natural contingencies. In 
response, Kant searches for a new system that could generate species boundaries from 
experience itself. In contrast to preformationists such as Abraham Kästner and Victor 
Albrecht von Haller, who aimed to adapt the Linnaean programme to explain variation 
through time as the accidental change of non-hereditary characteristics though the effect of 
external forces (environment, climate, diet etc.), Kant follows Buffon, who classified species 
according to their reproductive capacities. He separates his own proposal from Linnaeus by 
identifying two research programmes within the field of natural history: the description of 
nature (Naturbeschreibung), which follows the Linnaean system, and natural history 
(Naturgeschichte), which follows the vital materialists such as Buffon. Natural description 
aims to classify the actual system of species based on the assumption that organisation is 
irreducible to matter and is the result of an original act of divine creativity. Natural history 
accounts for the present system on the assumption that form is an emergent property of matter 
that comes into being within space and time. Kant states that the ‘former provides a school 
system for memory; the latter provides a natural system for the understanding. The first only 
aims at bringing creatures under titles; the second aims at bringing them under laws’ (VvRM 
02: 429, see PG AA 09: 161). 
Kant’s account of natural history has been described as ‘explanatory’ as opposed to 
‘descriptive’, for it aims to account for the present order of nature according to laws.30 To 
show how natural history draws the manifold of organic form under laws for the 
understanding, Kant rejects Linnaeus’ abstract category of ‘variety’ in favour of Buffon’s 
physical concept of ‘race’. In Histoire Naturelle Buffon advanced the notion of rasse to 
                                                            
28 Kant has been rightly identified as one of the founding pillars of racism (see Bernasconi 2001, Mills 
2005, Kleingeld 2007). While this debate lies beyond my present concern, if my argument has anything 
to bear on the assessment of Kant’s theory of race it is simply to show that while his conception of 
natural history might have been necessary for the racist views advanced in his essays, it is by no means 
sufficient. Kant’s account of natural history does nothing to resist his undoubtedly racist beliefs and yet 
it does not necessitate them. 
29 See Sloan 1990, 307. 
30 Fisher 2007. 
explain the presence of fertile half-breeds. Race denotes distinct varieties within a species that 
are passed on to the following generations. Fertility between these varieties indicates that they 
must share a common origin despite having different hereditary traits.31 Kant explains that 
while natural description is only capable of distinguishing varieties through the practice of 
‘logical division’ that, for all intents and purposes, ‘I make in my head’ (dividing quadrupeds 
in terms of various modes of locomotion etc.), natural history identifies races genealogically, 
that is, through their ‘physical division’ governed by time and space (VvRM, AA 02: 435n). 
It traces ‘a great many of seemingly different kinds to races of the same species’, thereby 
transforming ‘the school system of the description of nature, which is now so extensive, into a 
physical system of the understanding.’ Natural history does not build an inventory of natural 
singularities from which to derive character resemblances but rather searches for the historical 
unity of a stem as evidenced through physical relationships (Verwandschaften) and generation 
(Erzeugung). To account for the variety of human races and the fertility of children borne 
from inter-racial union, Kant identifies a single generative stock (Stamm) that resembles 
Buffon’s moulding forces, in which the germs (Keime) account for the specific characteristics 
of class and adaptive capacities (Anlagen) account for their specific combination. He cites 
‘Buffon’s rule’, which identifies species according to the ability to ‘produce fertile young with 
one another (whatever differences in shape they may be)’, to show that the ‘natural division 
into species and kinds [Gattungen und Arten] in the animal kingdom is grounded in the 
common law of propagation, and the unity of the species is nothing other than the unity of the 
generative power [zeugenden Kraft] that is universally valid for a certain manifoldness of 
animals’ (VvRM, AA 02: 429). Kant’s notion of a race is thus a ‘subspecies’ (Abartung), a 
hereditarily different kind that belongs to the same species and yet preserves its acquired 
characteristics over generations. He thereby admits change to the extent that he accepts 
Buffon’s idea of degeneration, yet he preserves the perfection of the created order by 
maintaining the immutability of species. 
 
2. ‘Determination of the concept of a human race’ 
2.1 The critical turn 
In Kritik der Reinen Venunft (1781/7) Kant’s concern shifts from the historical 
development of characteristics across time and space to the epistemic status of time and space 
as such. Time and space are neither real nor subordinate to objects and their relations, he 
argues, but the forms of human sensibility in which objects are experienced (see KrV, A 19-
49/B 33-66). Things that lie outside the limits of possible experience, such as original stems, 
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generative forces, or past adaptive modifications can be the items of speculation in our search 
for a unified system of nature, but they cannot be known. 
The critical settlement cleaves an abyss between theoretical science and metaphysics. 
While Kant’s pre-critical natural history operated on the theoretical assumption that the 
cosmos forms a systematic, self-replicating whole, the critical Kant transforms systematicity 
into a regulative ideal of knowledge that stands separate from nature (KrV, A 644/B 672).32 
Nature is simply ‘the existence of things, insofar as that existence is determined according to 
universal laws’ (Prol, AA 04: 294). The system of nature, the idea that this existence of things 
forms a law-governed arrangement, is an ideal of reason. This settlement raises a monumental 
problem for the practice of natural history: on what grounds might we apply rational concepts 
to empirical objects in order to bring the manifold of appearances into a law-governed order? 
In NTH Kant used the notion of dynamic particles endowed with a ‘secret art’ to explain how 
mechanical laws could bring about the perfect development of the cosmos. In VvRM he 
appealed to ‘the unity of the generative power’ and an ‘original stem’ to explain the capacity 
of a species to alter its form in response to adaptive pressures and pass these alterations on to 
the next generation. Yet the notions of dynamic particles and original stems are not a priori 
categories of the understanding constitutive of nature but concepts that the natural historian 
applies to nature as an already constituted manifold of appearances. In the Transcendental 
Dialectic of the first Critique Kant separates the constitutive principles of the understanding, 
the conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience, from the regulative principles of 
reason, rules that we give to ourselves concerning how we should order the already 
constituted objects of experience.33 Kant’s idea is that while the understanding presents the 
appearances in a causal sequence as determined in space and time, it leaves the form that 
arises from such a sequence radically underdetermined. To discover the laws responsible for 
the formal arrangement of matter we must go looking for order in nature.34 Yet nothing in 
nature can confirm that appearances adhere to systematicity. Nature (as the sum of 
appearances) is radically separated from reason (as the ideal of systematicity). We cannot 
prescribe to nature that systematic unity must exist. The correspondence of nature to our need 
for order is instead a principle that governs our reflection on nature as a system. 
 
                                                            
32 See Friedman 1991. 
33 Kant states that while the rules of systematicity ‘seem to be transcendental’, they ‘can really be used 
in its elaboration as heuristic principles with good success, yet without one being able to accomplish a 
transcendental deduction of them’ (KrV, A 664/B 692). 
34 For example, Kant states that reason gives us the ‘logical principle’ of the unity of nature, which 
drives us to search for ‘the hidden identity’ that unites different phenomena under basic forces (KrV, B 
677). 
2.2 The concept of race 
Kant returns to the problem of explanation in natural history in his essay 
‘Bestimmung des Begriffs einer Menschenrace’ published in the Berlinische Monatsschift in 
November 1785. Here he defends the monogenetic account of the human species he began in 
the 1770s from critics who attacked his account of an original stock that subsequently 
developed into four races. His critics are misguided, Kant argues, for they mistake his 
speculative hypothesis for a theoretical account of origins. In response, Kant aims to show 
that natural history does not provide an objective narrative of events in history but rather 
yields a concept of race that, unlike the Linnaean system, can provide a law-governed account 
of how variable characteristics are nevertheless passed on without fail. Race is not an 
empirical concept based on description alone, he contends, for description is limited to a static 
conception of organisation that only permits the alteration of non-inheritable characteristics. 
Yet as he demonstrated in the first Critique, neither is race an a priori concept of the 
understanding that determines the unity of appearances. What then is the concept of race, if it 
is neither an a posteriori, empirical concept nor an a priori concept of the understanding?  
Kant explains the concept of race according to a fundamental principle of natural 
history: ‘one finds in experience what one needs only if one knows in advance what to look 
for’ (BBM, AA 08: 91). Kant’s idea is that because bare experience does not contain 
systematic order, we can only discover the existence of physical relationships and generations 
if we go looking for them. The natural historian notices certain generalizations, such as the 
invariable inheritance of accidental characteristics (e.g. the paradigmatic example for Kant is 
skin colour). She then reasons that it is only possible to explain the necessity of this 
phenomenon if she assumes that such a potential lies ‘in the germs of the to us unknown 
original phylum of the human species’ (BBM, AA 08: 98). Of course, this original stock 
cannot appear as a product of experience. It features rather as a ‘must’ derived from her 
search for an explanatory system that can avoid speculation about organic form (what his 
critics thought he was doing) and the unnecessary recourse to divine action (what he felt that 
natural describers were doing). The only way to navigate between these two dangers, Kant 
reasons, is to examine the derivation of the variety of human form ‘from one single phylum, 
because without the latter the necessity of the heredity would not be comprehensible’ (BBM, 
AA 08: 99). 
To reassure those who might be concerned that his natural history permits a 
theologically dangerous account of degeneration, Kant stresses that the notion of a single 
phylum in fact defends the principle of immutability: that ‘throughout all of organic nature in 
all changes of individual creatures their species is preserved unchanged’ (BBM, AA 08: 97). 
The notion of a single phylum allows us to exclude ‘any explanation which maintains that the 
transmission [of inheritable characters] – even that which is only accidental, which is not 
always successful – could ever be the effect of a cause other than that which lies in the germs 
and endowments of the species itself.’ No external force is responsible for transmission, 
whether divine intervention or environmental effects, for the agency of historical 
development must lie internal to the organic system. 
 Kant’s argument in BBM shows a strained commitment to elements from both 
preformationism and epigenesis. One the one hand, Kant’s attempt to explain the 
development of living beings according to the mechanical laws of nature leads him to accept 
the idea of pre-existing form. However, this pre-exiting form is different to the standard view 
of preformationism, for it does not exist apart from matter as an external telos but rather 
within the phenomenal sphere of time and change. Thus Kant seems to require an active 
theory of matter, as he did in his pre-critical natural history, wherein a non-Newtonian power 
is constitutive of organic development. Yet such a power transgresses the limits of critical 
philosophy, which yields a concept of matter exhaustively determined by efficient causal 
connections blind to matters of form. In NTH Kant doubted the possibility of building a 
theory of matter that could account for the formation of a worm for the reason that organic 
structures are too complex. In the first Critique he destroys any chance of such an 
achievement by arguing that organic structures are discontinuous with nature as an already 
constituted sphere of appearances. Yet in BBM Kant presents race as a rational concept that is 
nevertheless derived from the necessary unfolding of germs and original dispositions, thereby 
requiring a formative law discontinuous with the laws of the understanding. 
  
2.3 Kant’s response to Herder 
If Kant was not already aware of the problem that an active force posed to his critical 
system, it became apparent to him as he reviewed Herder’s Ideen zur Philosophie der 
Geschichte der Menschheit (1784-85). In the introduction to Ideen Herder praises Kant’s pre-
critical NTH, and sets out, following the structure of Kant’s early essay, to provide a 
developmental history of nature that begins with the formation of the earth as ‘a star among 
stars’ and culminates in the cultivation of human capacities.35 However, rather than 
explaining the cosmological origins of life through entirely mechanical forces, as did Kant, 
Herder’s aim is to identify an invisible, animating force responsible for the development of 
organic form. In Book III he attempts to identify this force as a single power behind the three 
organic powers (elasticity, irritability and sensibility) identified by Haller in the physiology of 
the animal body.36 He speculates that ‘infinite is the wisdom of God, which combined these 
powers with the different parts of the human body.’37 
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In his 1785 review of Ideen Kant attacks Herder’s ‘hypothesis of invisible forces’, 
which claims to identify an ‘invisible universal nature’ responsible for organisation. Herder’s 
endeavour is futile, Kant claims, for it simply attempts to ‘explain what one does not 
comprehend from what one comprehends even less’ (RezHerder, AA 08: 54). That is, it 
attempts to explain the emergence of organised form by reference to a creative force derived 
from an analogy with our own form-creating powers. In Kant’s view, not only does this 
explanation fail to elucidate nature’s apparent vitality, for it calls on a placeholder as murky 
as that which it aims to elucidate, it also violates the mechanical properties of matter as 
constituted by the categories. While he ‘fully concurs’ with Herder on account of the need for 
a genetic force to explain the invariable transference of acquired traits, Kant remains 
committed to a form of preformationism that denies the emergence of order from bare matter. 
He returns to his account of germs, appealing to a genetic force that ‘appropriately modifies 
itself internally in accordance with differences of the external circumstances’ (RezHerder, AA 
08: 62). Kant qualifies Herder’s appeal to such a force as an ‘assumption’ rather than 
something objectively present for the natural historian: 
 
One could call this natural vocation of the formative nature also ‘germs’ or ‘original 
dispositions,’ without thereby regarding the former as primordially implanted 
machines and buds that unfold themselves only when occasioned (as in the system of 
evolution [i.e. preformationism]), but merely as limitations, not further explicable, of 
a self-forming faculty, which latter we can just as little explain or make 
comprehensible. (RezHerder, AA 08: 62-63) 
 
In contrast to Herder’s vital power, Kant claims that his theory of germs and dispositions does 
not give an objective account of organisation but simply regulates inquiry, allowing the 
natural historian to build a classificatory system by reference to organising principles that 
cannot be constituted. His point is that when it comes to species variation natural history 
cannot be grounded on an a priori, constitutive account of matter, for organisation is entirely 
contingent on experience. Natural history is rather a research programme that involves 
feedback between regulative principles and empirical findings in the process of building a 
system of nature. 
 
3. ‘On the use of teleological principles’ 
3.1 Forster’s critique 
In his 1788 essay ‘Über den Gebrauch teleologischer Principien in der Philosophie’ 
Kant’s understanding of natural history had clearly developed in light of his review of 
Herder’s Ideen. The essay responds to a paper by the popular natural historian Johann Georg 
Forster entitled ‘Noch etwas über die Menschenrassen’, which appeared in the Teutsche 
Merkur in 1786. In this paper Forster defends the Linnaean classificatory programme against 
Kant’s separation of natural description from natural history, claiming that Kant requires the 
natural historian to project onto nature structural features that are far more arbitrary than the 
physiological categories established by Linnaeus. 
Forster begins by attacking Kant’s guiding principle that ‘one finds in experience 
what one needs only if one knows in advance what to look for’ (BBM, AA 08: 91). This 
principle yields Kant’s notion of an original condition of the human species that produces ‘an 
invariably heritable difference’ that can be traced back to ‘one and the same line of decent’.38 
Forster’s claim is that far from leading the natural historian to the true conception of heredity, 
Kant’s principle is in fact guilty of ‘the most common of all illusions, namely, that we, in the 
appointed search for that which we need, often also believe that we have found it there, where 
it does not really exist.’39 Against Kant’s hypothesis Forster defends the Linnaean principle 
that variable properties such as skin colour are accidental, and thus ‘not sufficient for the 
differentiation of species.’40 In opposition to Kant’s programme, which imagines some 
original state that led to the present constellation of the races, the Linnaean system 
differentiates a variety from a species ‘simply through the inconstancy of its characteristic 
features.’41 Gradations of skin colour are merely accidental changes according to 
environmental conditions, and thus cannot serve to determine the races. 
To provide a Linnaean determination of race, Forster turns instead to a ‘physiological 
and anatomical basis’, which, in his view, yields the true invariably heritable characteristics.42 
This criterion identifies two races or lineages of descent, the Negro and the European: ‘the 
Negro possesses, both in consideration of outer as well as inner form, visibly far more that is 
consonant with the lineage of apes than with whites.’ While Forster is tentative to conclude 
that race maps on to species,43 he concedes so in practice, claiming that the invariable 
inheritance of anatomy renders the two races fundamentally different by virtue of their 
lineage. His point is that Kant’s monogenetic account of species can only be ‘a science for 
gods and not for human beings’, for it requires theoretical knowledge of an original stock. 
‘Who has the means of making known the ancestral tree of even a single variety up to its 
species’, Forster asks, ‘if that variety did not first come into being from another before our 
very own eyes?’44 If the invariable differences characteristic of race ‘can no longer be traced 
historically back to their point of origination, then the least that we can do is regard the 
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descent as underterimined; and the distinction that Kant wants to make between the concepts 
of the description of nature and the knowledge of natural history must become altogether 
void.’45 
 
3.2 Defending the teleological principle 
Kant’s aim in ÜGTP is to show that Forster’s objections to his account of race ‘derive 
only from the misunderstanding of the principle from which I start’ (ÜGTP, AA 08: 161). In 
Kant’s view, Forster had suspected him ‘for wanting to answer a question of the physical 
investigation of nature through documents of religion’ (ÜGTP, AA 08: 160), that is, for 
replacing natural history with theoretical pantheism. To prove Forster wrong, Kant seeks to 
clarify his notion of the starting principle for natural history in light of his critical 
epistemology. ‘Nature’, Kant states, ‘is the sum-total of all that exists as determined by laws’, 
while ‘world’ concerns the ‘supreme cause’ (ÜGTP, AA 08: 157). The first concerns physics 
and its practice is ‘theoretical’. The second concerns metaphysics and its practice is 
‘teleological’. In ‘all examination of nature reason rightly calls for theory first’, Kant 
explains, which leads to the deduction of the categories and the fundamental categories of all 
objects of thought. Yet ‘where theory abandons us’ – where we find necessity in nature that is 
irreducible to mechanical causality – we ‘need to start from a teleological principle’ (ÜGTP, 
AA 08: 157). What Kant wants to show is that theoretical reason cannot yield a theory of 
invariable inheritance, for there is no reason a priori why we should attribute an organising 
principle to living beings. Forster is right to the extent that in terms of ‘nature’ as the sum 
total of appearances varieties are underdetermined (accidental). Without the assumption that 
variations result from a purposive causality they appear utterly contingent. However, Kant 
recognises that when ‘reason on the theoretical path of nature … is not able to achieve its 
entire intention as wished,’ which is to develop a system of nature, we must pursue a 
teleological mode of inquiry. Forster took issue with this proposal, Kant explains, for he 
 
finds it awkward to establish a principle in advance which is supposed to guide the 
investigator of nature even in searching and observing, and especially a principle that 
would orient observation toward a natural history to be furthered by this procedure, 
in contrast to a mere description of nature. (ÜGTP, AA 08: 161) 
 
The problem with Forster’s view, as it was with Linnaeus, is that it assumes that we can 
derive invariable characteristics from bare experience. Kant agrees with Forster that ‘a 
narrative of events in nature [cannot] be reached by any human reason’, for such would be, as 
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Forster duly noted, a ‘science of the gods’. Yet Kant nevertheless insists that ‘nothing of a 
purposive nature could ever be found through mere empirical groping without a guiding 
principle of what to search for.’ This is to say that ‘only methodologically conducted 
experience can be called observing.’ 
Kant aims to demonstrate the superiority of his account of ‘methodologically 
conducted experience’ or ‘observation’ over Forster’s descriptive approach by showing how 
the two programmes yield different results. He turns Forster’s examination of variation in 
skin colour among native Americans. The Linnaean principle of variation leads Forster to 
attribute the variety of skin colour to external effects in the environment. Skin colour in 
Forster’s view is an accidental, non-hereditary characteristic that could change back to its 
original state given the right environmental conditions. This conclusion raises an interpretive 
problem, however, for Forster’s own example points to various gradations in skin colour 
within the same environmental system. To explain this anomaly, Forster had to ‘assume two 
original phyla in order to explain these characters’ (ÜGTP, AA 08: 169). Yet what are his 
grounds for differentiating the accidental variation of skin colour from the necessary 
inheritance (physiology and anatomy) of the original phyla? Forster’s ‘rash reasoning’ simply 
‘follows the lead of Linné’s principle of the persistence of the character’ (ÜGTP, AA 08: 
161). Kant’s account, on the other hand, claims to follow a rational principle. The existence 
of various gradations of skin colour in the same climate confirms ‘the conjection of an 
entirely consistent generative affinity though the unity of a phyletic origin, while 
simultaneously confirming the conjection of a cause of their classificatory difference residing 
in the human begins themselves, not merely in the climate’ (ÜGTP, AA 08: 177). For Kant, 
‘it is possible and indeed more appropriate to the philosophical mode of explanation to view 
[the variation of characteristics] as the development of purposive predispositions planted in 
one phylum.’ What Forster viewed as the ‘degeneration [Ausartung]’ of an original stem is 
rather a ‘subspecies [Abartung]’ (ÜGTP, AA 08: 163-4). By rejecting the distinction between 
natural description and natural history, Forster removes the natural researcher’s capacity to 
distinguish between kinds and subspecies, and thus renders variation contingent in regard to 
natural laws. 
Kant’s account of observing presages the reflective operation of judgment he 
develops in KU. In the Transcendental Dialectic of the first Critique, the regulative principles 
that guide our reflection on nature as a system are already available in advance and are 
‘admitted as problematic only’ (KrV, B 674). Observation, on the other hand, is 
‘methodologically conducted experience’ (ÜGTP, AA 08: 161). It is not a form of reason but 
a form of judgment, the seat of experience. Yet judgment, as it is understood in the first 
Critique, is simply ‘the faculty of subsuming under rules; that is, of distinguishing whether 
something does or does not stand under a given rule’ (KrV, B 171). This determinative 
conception of judgment stands in contrast with observation, which involves the search for 
rules. The key to Kant’s analysis is the sharp distinction between cognition and reflective 
observation, a distinction that is made possible by the critical philosophy. Natural history 
would be a ‘science of the gods’ only if the natural historian were to think that her research is 
constitutive of experience. Natural history, for Kant, is far more epistemologically modest. 
Governed by the teleological principle, it consists only ‘in tracing back, as far as the analogy 
permits, the connection between certain present-day conditions of the things in nature and 
their causes in earlier times according to laws of efficient causality, which we do not make up 
but derive from the powers of nature as it presents itself to us now’ (ÜGTP, AA 08: 161-2). 
Kant’s critical philosophy informs his separation of natural description from natural 
history in the following way. As he established in the first Critique, causality is the principle 
that ‘Everything that happens, that is, begins to be, presupposes something upon which it 
follows according to a rule’ (KrV, A 189/B 232). Yet causality, as a dynamical category of 
the understanding, concerns only the time ordered succession of objects of possible 
experience. As Kant states in ÜGTP, while we cannot ‘know a priori that there must be ends 
in nature’, we ‘can very well know a priori that there must be a connection of causes and 
effects in nature’ (ÜGTP, AA 08: 182). This entails that ‘the use of the teleological principle 
with respect to nature is always empirically conditioned’; the need to reflect on ends in nature 
arises because something in experience exceeds our understanding and invites reflection. 
When we inquire into the development of an item without our having perceived this 
developmental process, the categories cannot apply, for it lies outside the bounds of possible 
experience. By following the teleological principle we are able to project onto nature the 
expectation that a rule that accounts for its development can be found. This principle is 
teleological to the extent that it allows the natural historian to view the object as a ‘natural 
end’, as something that does not develop accidently but according to an inner principle that is 
expressed in the arrangement of the parts (ÜGTP, AA 08: 162). Of course, the understanding 
knows that teleological inquiry is unable to yield knowledge of efficient causes. Thus, in 
contrast to physics, natural history ‘can only point to fragments or shaky hypotheses’ (ÜGTP, 
AA 08: 163). Such hypotheses are not mere guesswork, however, for ‘the concept [of race] is 
well grounded in the reason of each observer of nature who infers from a hereditary 
particularity of different interbreeding animals … a common cause, namely a cause that lies 
originally in the phylum of the species’ (ÜGTP, AA 08: 163). 
 
3.3 Organic beings 
In Kant’s natural history, the concept of race is a rational principle that enables the 
natural historian to unify a multitude of phenomena into a system of laws. By categorising the 
subspecies within a general species, the natural historian identifies how ‘the greatest degree of 
manifoldness in the generation can be united by reason with the greatest unity of phyletic 
origin’ (ÜGTP, AA 08: 164). Kant does not try to unify theoretical science with metaphysics, 
as he did in his early essay NTH. He instead claims that the simplicity his theory of race 
brings to classification demonstrates the convergence of our rational anticipation of 
systematic order with nature as the totality of appearances. While observation makes ‘known 
the unity of the phyletic origin’, it is conditioned on the assumption that affinity exists: 
natural history ‘must be guided by a determinate principle merely in order to observe, i.e., to 
pay attention to that which could indicate the phyletic origin, not just the resemblance of 
characters, since in that case we are dealing with a problem of natural history, not of the 
description of nature and of mere methodical nomenclature’ (ÜGTP, AA 08: 164). We can 
only search for ‘indications’ of the phyletic origin, for it lies beyond the limits of theoretical 
science. 
Kant observes that his idea of a phyletic origin entails the idea of an organic being, 
for it implies that there is ‘some matter in which everything is mutually related to each other 
as end and means, which can only be though as a system of final causes.’ The possibility of a 
phyletic origin – as far as human reason is concerned – lies within a teleological rather than a 
physical-mechanical mode of explanation, meaning that ‘there can be no investigation in 
physics about the origin of organisation itself.’ Such an inquiry would lie ‘outside of natural 
science in metaphysics.’ Kant explains his position as follows: 
 
I myself derive all organization from organic beings (through generation) and all later 
forms (of this kind of natural things) from laws of the gradual development of 
original predispositions, which were to be found in the organization of its phylum. 
Such development can often be seen in the translplanting of plants. How this phylum 
itself came about, this problem lies entirely beyond the limits of all physics possible 
to human beings, within which I believed that I had to hold myself. (ÜGTP, AA 08: 
179). 
 
In Kant’s view, both Herder and Forster, in one way or another, leave ‘the fertile soil of 
investigation of nature to the desert of metaphysics’ (ÜGTP, AA 08: 180). While Herder 
claims knowledge of original vitality, Forster claims that God’s created order is disclosed in 
our descriptive practices. The ‘true metaphysics’, on the other hand, ‘knows the boundaries of 
human reason,’ its ‘hereditary defect [Erbfehler]’, namely, that ‘it cannot and may not at all 
concoct a priori basic powers (for then it would devise nothing but empty concepts).’ The 
natural researcher guided by true metaphysics can do ‘nothing else than reduce the powers 
which experience teaches it (to the extent that the latter differ only in appearance but are 
basically identical) to the smallest possible number, and to look for the pertinent basic power 
in the world, if it is a matter of physics, or outside the world, if it is a matter of metaphysics’ 
(ÜGTP, AA 08: 180). A phyletic origin exists outside the world of efficient causes to the 
extent that it can be both cause and effect of itself: 
 
Now the concept of an organic being is this: that it is a material being which is 
possible only through the relation of everything contained in it to each other as end 
and means (and indeed every anatomist as well as every physiologist actually starts 
from this concept). (ÜGTP, AA 08: 181) 
 
In an organic being, the whole accounts for the existence of the part, and the part contributes 
toward the whole.46 This is to say that some kind of subjective state is causally efficacious, 
even if the very notion of a subjective state lies beyond the concept of matter that guides 
inquiry. In the case of an artefact – a watch, for example – the part might exist for the sake of 
the whole, but it does not exist because of the whole. The whole does not produce the part but 
rather an end external to the artefact, such as the idea in the mind of a designer. Thus it can be 
explained entirely in the realm of physics. In the case of an organic being, on the other hand, 
the part exists for the sake of and because of the whole. It is the cause of the whole and its 
effect. Kant reasons that for organic beings, ‘a basic power that is effectuated through an 
organization has to be thought as a cause effective according to ends, and this in such a 
manner that these ends have to be presupposed for the possibility of the effect’ (ÜGTP, AA 
08: 181). Yet returning to the limits of true metaphysics, Kant recognises that we can know of 
such powers ‘in terms of their ground of determination only in ourselves, namely in our 
understanding and will, as a cause of the possibility of certain products that are arranged 
entirely according to ends, namely that of works of art.’ To cause an artefact is simply a 
matter of the efficient causes studied by physics; I move my arm to spread paint on the 
canvas. To cause the possibility of an artwork, however, I require a rational power, ‘a faculty 
to produce something according to an idea which is called end’ (ÜGTP, AA 08: 181). 
The theoretical puzzle of the teleological principle is that we must search for what we 
do not yet know to be there, and the only way that we can confirm its presence is by yielding 
systematic results on the assumption that it is there to be discovered. The natural describer, 
who does not have such a method, ‘will have to search [for affinity] again; for what he needs 
in order to decide whether there is a real or merely a nominal affinity among the creatures 
will not present itself to him on its own.’ Kant’s point is that affinity is not a fact in nature to 
be discovered. The natural describer can search only for ‘variety’, the ‘hereditary peculiarity 
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that is not classificatory, since it is not propagated unfailingly’ (ÜGTP, AA 08: 165). The 
historian of nature, on the other hand, classifies in terms of ‘race’, an ‘unfailing hereditary 
peculiarity which justifies the division into classes but yet does not warrant the division into 
kinds.’ This allows the natural historian to unify ‘the greatest difference in shape’ by a 
‘common phyletic origin’ (ÜGTP, AA 08: 165). 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper I have argued that Kant’s critical turn does not so much break from his 
pre-critical natural history as transform the teleological method from constitutive practice of 
accounting for the necessary development of nature as a system to a regulative practice of 
guiding our reflection on organisation in nature. In a letter to Reinhold in 1787 Kant gives us 
a clue to understanding how his critical examination of teleology in the third Critique 
emerged from this development. He apologies to Reinhold for not praising his Letters on the 
Kantian Philosophy in the Teutsche Merkur, and explains the reason for his neglect as 
follows: 
 
However, an essay in that very journal, written by the younger Herr Forster and 
directed against some other ideas of mine, made it difficult to do this without taking 
on both projects together. As far as the latter is concerned, namely my argument with 
Herr F, I was prevented from publishing a clarification of my hypothesis. (Br, AA 10: 
513) 
 
In the course of responding to Forster’s essay Kant discovered a new kind of a priori that 
allows judgment to do the regulative work he formerly ascribed to reason in KrV. For Forster, 
natural history aims to present the actual order of nature. Thus to come to nature with any 
prior determination is to find in nature what is simply not there. Kant responds by arguing 
that Forster’s natural description can only yield an arbitrary differentiation between nominal 
degeneration and supposedly ‘true’ species boundaries, for it is impervious to historical 
development. In contrast to Forster’s methodology, Kant’s account of observation turns on 
the regulative use of the teleological principle, enabling the natural historian to begin with 
experience and search for a rule capable of accounting for the contingent arrangement of 
objects. In this sense Kant expands his conception of science from the ideal of mathematics, a 
complete and static system, to include a research programme guided by the assumption that 
nature is amenable to our search for rules. Though means of observation the researcher is able 
to form concepts and derive laws to unify the manifold of appearances into the simplest 
system.47 Kant begins his third Critique with this idea in the ‘Erste Einleitung’ (1789), stating 
that the ‘principle of reflection on given objects of nature is that for all things in nature 
empirically determinate concepts can be found, which is to say the same as that in all of its 
products one can always presuppose a form that is possible for general laws cognizable by us’ 
(EEKU, AA 20: 211). The need for such a principle for experimental science is paramount; if 
we could not presuppose it, ‘then all reflection would become arbitrary and blind, and hence 
would be undertaken without any well-grounded expectation of its agreement with nature’ 
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